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Some oil refining companies have recently entered the field of exploration and 
production (E&P). Both the relatively high financial performances of E&P companies 
and the shrinking refining margin may motivate refiner‟s decision to enter E&P. 
However, in making this decision, there are other factors to be considered. This study 
utilizes vertical integration and diversification theories to develop an integrated 
framework. This framework determines the factors which should be involved in a firm‟s 
decision to enter another business area. In this theoretical approach and its application to 
Korean refining companies‟ decision to enter into E&P, we discuss both the cost benefits 
and the advantages to acquiring strategic assets of the new business. As sources of short-
term cost benefits, the paper discusses site specificity and regional performance. As long-
term requirements, the paper explores the need to acquire E&P strategic assets. In early-
stage decision making, the best mode may be a small equity investment in regional 
consortia. As a company acquires more and more strategic assets, it can decide to pursue 
global opportunities and/or to acquire an E&P company. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Since 2003, a sharp increase in oil prices has been caused by a rise in developing 
countries‟ demand for oil. Thus, oil exploration and production (E&P) enterprises have 
demonstrated superior financial performance. Not only such performances, but the 
limited margin in refining may motivate some managers to make inroads into E&P. 
While not a large number of companies have done so yet, some refining companies in 
Korea and Japan have moved into E&P through a different mode, such as a consortium or 
joint venture. 
When the new E&P venture provides their refineries with crude oil, the entrance 
into E&P can be understood as a vertical integration, which may be intended to 
counteract what is likely to be imperfect competition in the oil market. However, refining 
companies commonly purchase their crude oil requirements from the competitive oil 
market. Thus, classifying such a venture as vertical integration is questionable. It is more 
properly classified as diversification. Therefore, the motivating factors in deciding to 
enter into E&P are complex. Whether the strategy is vertical integration or 
diversification, such a strategic decision should not be guided by the apparent growth of 
the company but by a future financial performance better than the current state.  
In this regard, management may be better equipped to make the optimum decision 
to enter E&P by using a theoretical approach. Such an approach allows them to look into 
the motivation and requirements for the success of a strategic decision. There has been 
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much theoretical development in both vertical integration and diversification, and a lot of 
empirical research deals with those strategies using industrial data. Some studies 
approach separately vertical integration and diversification. Others include vertical 
integration as part of a diversification strategy. Neither framework, however, sufficiently 
describes both strategies, for neither fully explains all the complex activities of a refining 
company. 
Adding to the confusion is the fact that these studies were based on static 
analyses. As a firm is an organic institution, their strategic decisions can evolve. If a 
refining company enters E&P as part of a consortium in the region, it can then purchase, 
at reduced cost, equity crude oil for its refinery. After the successful operation of this 
consortium and acquisition of strategic assets, the refining company can move to another 
opportunity in the business. If the selected opportunity is geographically far from its 
refinery, it may no longer economical to use this source of crude as provision for their 
refinery. In such a case, the company‟s first decision can be categorized as a vertical 
integration, but the latter should be regarded as a diversification. Therefore, the 
company‟s strategic decision must be understood dynamically. 
The object of this research is to establish a framework which can be applied to the 
complex environment of refining companies‟ entrance to E&P. It focuses on the cost 
benefit as a short-term requirement and the acquisition of the strategic asset in E&P, as 
the long-term requirement that can ensure future competitiveness in the business. By 
contrasting and simplifying the vertical integration and diversification theory, I 
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developed a framework that can define the differences and commonalities. This simple 




Chapter 2: Theories of the Vertical Integration and Diversification 
 
2.1. VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
Vertical integration takes place in the value chain of a production (Figure 1). A 
firm that has been supplying a product used as the input (intermediates) of another firm 
can decide to integrate the purchasing firm into its organization, or vice versa. Therefore, 
the vertical integration is the make-or-by decision of a firm (Coase, 1937).  
 
Figure 1: Vertical integration in the value chain. 
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2.1.1. TRANSACTION COST  
Transaction cost theory originated with Coase (1937). His use of it dealt with the 
creation of a firm, yet it is widely applied as the theoretical base for vertical integration. 
Coase argued that the price mechanism cannot provide the complete framework to 
explain the emergence of a firm. It is because that the allocation of production factor is 
dependent not only on the price mechanism but also on the economic planning, which 
exists in the economic system. That is, the firm does not incur the transactions of the 
market. Instead these are substituted by a firm‟s coordination which directs the 
production. 
Therefore the major reason of a firm‟s establishment is that there is a cost in using 
the market transaction. For example, negotiating to get a good position and making a 
contract with detailed terms and conditions of a transaction entail costs. Though, these 
transaction costs cannot be eliminated, they can be minimized by the firm‟s economic 
planning and coordinating function.  
2.1.2. MARKET FAILURE 
Williamson (1971) expanded on the advantages of a firm‟s integration from 
transaction cost benefits to a „strategic misrepresent risk‟ perspective. If a firm integrates, 
it can get to the ex-post information, which will reduce the chance of being exploited 
through the opportunistic behavior of its opponent firm. 
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Contractual Incompleteness 
Williamson gives as an example a purchasing firm; it may, if it is of the required 
input, have a preference for the short-term contracts to be adaptive in future environments 
and to make its sequential decisions. If the supplying firm, however, requires long-term 
investment to supply the inputs, it will ask the purchasing firm for a long-term supply. 
Thus conflicts may arise when there are, between the supply firm and the purchasing 
firm, opposing preferences for the contract period.  
In addition to that, even when both firms prefer a longer term contract to a large 
number of short-term contracts, the long-term contract cannot include the exact products, 
services and other contractual content due to the uncertainties of the future environment. 
A long-term contract describing the exact information, which can also be applied in 
future, may be prohibitively costly and/or may be impossible to achieve. Moreover, 
sustaining the original contract requires additional cost in monitoring the contractual 
partner, enforcing contractual promises and solving conflicts and lawsuits that may 
happen during the lifetime of the contract. What is worse, if the production technology 
and design of the product change, this contract will be of no use. It will be necessary to 
go through the costs of making a new contract.  
In summary, all of these factors related to future uncertainties make both the 
short-term and the long-term contract inefficient. So, internalization can help a firm avoid 
such contractual costs. Likewise, the vertical integration will cover the demerits in both 
short-term long-term contracts. (Mahoney, 1992) 
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Regulatory Authority 
A portion of transaction costs incurred by the transaction regulatory authority 
(such as government) can be avoided through internalization. A purchasing firm has to 
buy inputs with their sales tax levied in the market. If the purchasing firm substitutes the 
transaction into the firm by producing them internally, they can minimize the transaction 
cost imposed by the regulatory power. That is, it can reduce the production cost by 
avoiding the sales tax levied on its intermediate inputs 
Moral Hazard 
Moral hazards can arise when competing for symmetric incentives on future 
uncertainties. In the case of a cost-plus contract, the supplying firm may feel the contract 
does not provide it any incentives. As a firm normally wants to achieve efficiency while 
minimizing the product‟s cost, the supplying firm makes no effort to produce the product 
effectively. Instead, the firm could reallocate its effective production resources to other 
work that could provide them more incentive. This moral hazard would impair the 
advantage of the cost-plus contract.  
A purchasing firm may insist on the supplier‟s work being monitored to avoid the 
moral hazard of a supplying firm evaluating its own performance. An external purchasing 
firm, however, cannot do the monitoring effectively. Instead, a purchasing firm can 
internalize and bear the risks of the uncertainties and save on the monitoring cost while 
sustaining its input quality. 
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Anti-competitiveness  
With some commodities having different price elasticities by industry, vertical 
integration can provide a monopolistic benefit. For example, if „A‟ purchasing firm in „C‟ 
industry purchases an intermediate and has a substitute for it, the input has a high level of 
elasticity. On the other hand, if „B‟ purchasing firm operating in „D‟ industry has no 
substitute input, its elasticity will be low. In this situation, to maximize the profit, the 
supplying firm may sell its commodity at a low price to „A‟ and at a high price to „C‟. 
However, if „A‟ trades to „B‟ with a lower price than the supplying firm, the price policy 
of the supplying firm would work poorly. Accordingly, the supplying firm can choose to 




The theoretical background for diversification is somewhat different from vertical 
integration. While vertical integration is „linked‟ to its value chain, diversification does 
not require such boundary limitations. Penrose (2009) argues that if the current market 
provides little incentive, new opportunities for investment in other business areas 
compete with the investment in the current market. This strategy can strengthen a firm's 
productive activity and improve its financial performance without giving up the existing 
production base.  
2.2.1. ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND ECONOMIES OF SCOPE 
Economies of scale refer to the ability to perform activities at a lower cost per unit 
by performing them on a larger scale. In an economy of scale, a firm may have a big 
production base to reduce the unit cost and benefit from that scale.  In contrast, there are 
economies of scope, which refers to reducing the total cost of producing a variety of 
goods in one firm than separately in multiple firms. If a firm invests in developing one 
product, the accumulated know-how can be applied to the related product development, 
and this costs less than the investing in separate development.   In this way, learning and 
technological diffusion may contribute to increased profit (Bridge, 2005). Much research 
shows that economies of scale may be effective in simple capital-intensive industries 
where the learning economies are relatively insignificant. Economies of scope may be 
effective in the labor-intensive activities (Besanko, 1996).  
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2.2.2. RELATEDNESS 
Diversification may focus on its present market with a new product or on a new 
market with a present product. Porter (1985, Figure 2) claimed that only effective sharing 
of the existing activities in a firm‟s value chain can realize the objectives in 
diversification.  
In this sense, the relatedness between an existing business unit and a new 
opportunity is important. Many researchers have tried to discover the right calculation 
method of the relatedness.  Some have used SIC codes to represent product relatedness 
and market numbers to show the market diversity (Hoskisson, 1993; Raphael, 1989). 
Other research has focused on the „strategic asset‟ with the consideration that the real 
benefit of diversification comes from exploiting relatedness to create and accumulate new 
strategic assets more quickly and cheaply than competitors (Markides and Williamson, 





Figure 2:  Sharing value chain activities (Porter, 1985) 
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Table 1:  Strategic assets and their relatedness (Markides and Williamson, 1994, 
1997)  
Strategic Asset Relatedness 
customer assets brand recognition, customer loyalty and installed base 
channel assets established channel access, distributor loyalty and 
pipeline stock 
input assets knowledge of imperfect factor markets, loyalty of 
suppliers and financial capacity 
process assets proprietary technology, product or market-specific 
functional experience (e.g., in marketing or production) 
and organizational systems 
market knowledge assets accumulated information on the goals and behavior of 
competitors, price elasticity of demand or market 




Penrose (2009) asserted that the initial reallocation of excess assets into related 
production increases overall performance. Indeed, the efficiency loss in using the asset is 
less than the overall gain from added scale and scope.  
However, when assets are extended into unrelated businesses, efficiency loss may 
outweigh the gain, making the average performance of the business unit decline.  Much 
research shows that there is inverted curvilinear relationship between the relatedness and 
diversification performance (Palich, 2000). Thus, when a firm diversifies into an 
unrelated business, it could be hard to achieve a higher performance (Shleifer, 1990, 
Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3:  Inverted U-curve, the diversification performance by the relatedness. 




















2.2.3. RISK MANAGEMENT 
One of the reasons to diversify comes from the concerns about future 
uncertainties. In a single company, top level managers can put all of their resources and 
attention into one single thing and become excellent at it. Through this concentration, the 
firm builds competences in the skills and abilities that are important to the business; it 
develops connections with customers and suppliers, and establishes a long-lasting 
reputation.  
Later, it may seize opportunities to grow and maximize profit in its original base 
optimally allocating its resources, refraining from the competition, and minimizing the 
cost of production. Thus, such a specialized company, making one product and providing 
one service, may become more profitable than a diversified firm.  
However, this is possible only in a favorable market. When the market changes 
because of new technologies in production and new customer needs, profitably allocating 
its resources may be impossible, and the specialized company may become weak.  
In this environment, allocating a company‟s resources to new opportunities can 
make it more profitable. (Penrose, 2009). By allocating its resources away from its 
original production base, a firm can discover new opportunities in products and in 
markets, establishing a business portfolio that can reduce the risks of future uncertainties.  
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2.2.4. THE ROLE OF PLATFORM 
If the base business is in a strong, stable position, it will continue to make a good 
profit and generate cash. When a business is growing slowly, it doesn't have to reinvest 
its earnings to provide assets to support its own expansion. Such a business more or less 
runs itself, freeing its owners to deal with diversification and also provides cash to work 
with.  A firm is set to diversify when its core business is experiencing declining annual 
sales and profits, but it has the capital and managerial capability to compete in a new 
industry, and finally when there is relatedness that produces synergy among the 
businesses (Jung, 2010). 
Therefore, it is crucially important to consider the condition of the base business 
before getting into diversification. In that, a new business unit generally depends on the 
base unit which supports the new business for some time (Besanko, 1996); 
 Base unit may have to provide cash to purchase or start up another business unit 
or to fund early operations before the new business can pull its own weight. 
 Base unit may have to provide technical knowledge and support to entrance into 
distribution channels, contacts among suppliers, and a reputation in the customer 
base. 
 Base unit should have fewer risks than a new operation. As it is a source of 
stability for the combined firm. 
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2.3. INTEGRATION COST 
Coase (1937) mentioned the integration cost in considering the evolving size of a 
firm. He assumed that, if a firm grows with the benefit of transaction cost, there would be 
just one firm, which would enjoy not only gains from the transaction cost reduction but 
also from the incentives of monopoly gains. In the real world, however, this does not 
happen.  
Therefore, he claimed that there are opposing elements that prohibit the unlimited 
expansion of a firm. As a firm increases its size, the cost of adding a transaction function 
in the firm also increases. Furthermore, a firm may have difficulty in dealing with their 
increased complexity, failing to optimize the allocation of the many production factors. 
Therefore, the increased size of the firm may accelerate an increase in the integration 
cost. To illustrate this, when a marketing unit in an integrated firm has to cover diverse 
products, its original specialty may be diluted. Thus the firm must compromise the costs 
between generalization and specialization. Also, when a business unit wants to switch the 
production technology or exit the market, a firm using the common production facilities 
will suffer from the inflexibility.   
Therefore, all of these costs make the internalization less competitive than market 
transactions and decrease the return on internalization (Masten, 1991; Aggarwal, 2009). 
So, deciding whether to vertically integrate or to diversify is limited by its internalization 
costs. 
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2.4. VIEWS ON THE TWO THEORIES 
2.4.1. POSITIVE ASPECTS 
Including those advantages discussed above, Williamson (1971) categorized the 
basic advantages of the internal organization in the vertical integration: incentives, 
controls, and inherent structural advantages.   
 Integrating the function of the opponent firm removes the holdup problem from 
opportunistic behavior.  
 Integration places the transaction parties in a repeating relationship. By doing this, 
small conflicts in the internal organization can be mitigated and controlled by the 
management.  
 Resource allocation enables effective information exchange within the internal 
organization.  
 New knowledge and services acquired will provide a foundation that will benefit 
the new business area. 
 
In addition to the advantages from economies of scale/scope, business portfolio, 
and allocation of a firm‟s excess resources, Penrose (2009) points out the benefit‟s from 
managerial competence and productive opportunity. She asserts that the biggest 
restriction to a firm's growth is its domination by unambitious employees. Specialization 
of managerial knowledge and capability, in comparison, is a less serious limitation to the 
firm‟s branching out into new lines of activities.  Therefore, if the existing management is 
versatile and possesses the right vision and capability, and if there is a productive 
opportunity, the firm can successfully grow in a new market and a new line of production 
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2.4.2. NEGATIVE ASPECTS 
As discussed above, if markets are competitive and “work well,” it is more 
attractive for a firm to depend on the market than to integrate. Moreover, in a perfectly 
static business environment, vertical integration, whether driven to settle the bilateral 
monopoly market or to adapt to other market externalities, can gain no advantage 
(Williamson, 1994). For in a perfectly static business environment, the effort to settle a 
transaction contract and the costs determining the exact terms and conditions of it would 
be applied to a merger with an opponent firm with the same level of negotiation and 
valuation of the firm. 
Also, in internalization, there may be a problem of resource allocation. The 
increased complexity caused by integration can cause poor resource allocation.  
Especially compared to diversification, vertical integration requires more complex 
coordination in technology, management, production, and capital investment among 
vertically linked but dissimilar segments.  Also, if a firm has insufficient strategic assets 
to share to help realize economies of scale or scope, it would be hard to benefit from 
integration. 
One reason for diversification is the pursuit of growth by managers. This requires 
no assurance of increased performance through growth. Managers can diversify or 
vertically integrate when it is easier to acquire new sales than to develop them internally. 
These activities may be geared toward maintaining or enhancing the position of 
executives who make diversification decisions.  Therefore, this agency problem may 
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lower the firm‟s performance while reducing the shareholder‟s wealth. Such managerial 
activities must be monitored (Andrei, 1986., Joseph, 1992, Peter, 1998). 
In terms of business portfolios, resource concentration may, when a market 
environment changes negatively, weaken the firm. Nevertheless, it is not management‟s 
role to decide how to manage the risk from future uncertainties by allocating a firm‟s 
resources to another business.  It is rather the shareholder‟s decision. The same level of 
resource and risk management can be carried out by investors who want to maximize 
their investments‟ return (Amihud, 1981).  
Also, some authors claim that companies diversify so heavily because they could: 
rely on the firm‟s cash and enjoy high stock market valuations, managers "bought 
growth" rather than paying out dividends (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991)  
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Chapter 3: Integrated Framework 
A firm‟s strategic decision to enter into another business area includes both 
vertical integration and diversification.  Much theoretical and industrial research has been 
carried out on both ideas (Arocena, 2008, Fan, 2006). Some researchers use the 
transaction cost or market failure (Li, 2006) to explain both vertical integration and 
diversification theory; others use the competitiveness approach (Frery, 2006), of which 
various trials seem to be unclear in understanding the strategic decision of a firm.  
Also, most research done by the industry on these growth strategies has been done 
without clearly classifying vertical integration and diversification. For example, Davis 
(1992) investigated relatedness with COMPUSTAT II industrial segment data using the 
classic definition of relatedness: two digit SIC code and relationship to the customer. He 
tried to explain, with the same tool, both vertical integration and diversification. He 
concluded, however, that vertical integration is hard to explain with the structural 
constraints of SIC codes, and therefore, vertical integration research should be done with 
information obtained directly from firms. 
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An additional problem in industrial research is that most of it surveys along one 
time line (Claessens, 2003). If we admit that a firm‟s decision to enter into the new 
business area is not a static one but a series of dynamic ones, the comparison of the 
industrial performance at one static point has innate limitations. 
Therefore, in this section, I try to explain both growth strategies in an integrated 
frame including the consideration of time.  
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3.1. SHORT-TERM REQUIREMENT  
3.1.1. VERTICAL INTEGRATION PERSPECTIVE 
The transaction cost in vertical integration theory may be added to the total 
production cost. If the transaction cost in purchasing an intermediate product is high, a 
firm may decide to just add the cost to the price of its final product. In this case, this 
transaction cost would do no harm to a firm‟s performance, and there is no reason for the 
vertical integration.  In a market, however, that resists such additional costs, there would 
be pressure in increasing the market price of the product. This market will lower the 
profit of a firm and decrease its efficiency. Instead, if a firm can minimize the 
transaction-induced cost through integration, it can secure immediate benefits from it.  
Williamson asserts that vertical integration may happen in a condition of market 
failure. The reasoning is that a firm is concerned about future uncertainties and their risks 
to a holdup possibility with its component firm. If the holdup problem, however, deals 
with things that can happen in future but not necessarily in the short-term, and if there is 
weak asset specificity, integration could be substituted with many short-term contracts. 
Therefore, whether a vertical integration comes from the transaction cost reduction or 
from the market failure condition, there should be an instant benefit from vertical 
integration.  
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3.1.2. DIVERSIFICATION PERSPECTIVE 
Diversification provides benefits by utilizing a common production base or its 
current strategic assets in the new market.  A firm will want to profit from its new 
product by sharing the existing production line to compete with substitutes for the newly 
developed product.  To do so, the firm has to competitively price it with its substitutes. If 
it cannot do this, the firm profits little from diversifying. Likewise, if the benefit comes 
from the brand value, the benefit has to come from competitive pricing with same kinds 
of products of its competitors.  
As the demand of the diversified firm‟s product is finite, consumers will buy it 
only if it is competitively priced. Therefore, we can assume that profit from 
diversification is obtained through competitive pricing. Namely, we can consider the 
benefit to be a competitive cost benefit. And, as with vertical integration, diversification 
should provide instant benefits.  
3.1.3. COST BENEFIT 
In the new business, reducing the transaction cost and securing the competitive 
cost structure is the primary source of the cost benefit. Both the vertical integration and 
diversification should secure greater benefit than what it costs to integrate. In this respect, 
the only difference between vertical integration and diversification is whether the growth 
strategy lies in the same value chain or off it.  After entering into a new business, the cost 
benefit should be realized instantly.  
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3.2.1. STRATEGIC ASSET 
Porter (1980) claimed that, to be competitive in a market, a firm must provide a 
customer benefit. It may come from a lower cost or from greater customer satisfaction.  
Thus, if scale is the key driver of the required competitiveness, a firm may have a larger 
production plant than its rival. Whatever the case may be, when a firm goes into a new 
business or a new market, it must secure its competitiveness. And, in that business area, 
strategic assets are necessary to compete with other firms.  
There could be a variety of assets that differentiate a firm from its competitors.  
These include patent protection, brands and other methods of differentiating. The firm 
must control for the non-reproducible factors of production, such as site specificity, secret 
knowledge of the process, and retaining trained and experienced personnel. All of these 
will be the constraints of other competitors.  
In the new business, different strategic assets will be required to compete with 
other firms that produce the same kinds of products and services. In diversification, a 
firm requires new knowledge about producing different product and services and in the 
different market. And all of these should be competitive so that a firm can be profitable in 
the new business and can compete with competitors.  
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3.2.2. ACQUISITION OF STRATEGIC ASSET 
If competitors realize these asset values and pursue acquiring them by imitating or 
gathering similar, substitute assets, these assets may still not secure a firm‟s long-term 
competitiveness. Therefore, strategic assets to be utilized for long-term competitiveness 
should be hard to imitate and substitute (Dierickx, 1989). 
Williamson (1994) asserts that to be competitive, a firm must have access to the 
tangible and intangible assets required and used in the business. A firm may have a 
patent, the proprietary technology developed in the firm, or it may purchase or lease an 
asset in the open market.  They can also share it with partners.  
As a strategic asset cannot be acquired over the short-term, it is necessary to begin 
an acquiring process. Williamson claimed that internal accumulation is most important 
and depends on an ability to continuously adapt and improve a firm‟s strategic assets to 
changing market requirements. Also, in Claessens‟s empirical work proves that long-term 
performance depends on the learning effect. 
In summary, when a firm decides to enter into another business, it should acquire 
the strategic asset in the new business for its long-term competitiveness. And when 
making the decision, the firm must take into account its acquisition process. 
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3.3. CORE COMPETENCE 
Core competence is the collective knowledge and coordination skills in an 
existing business (Figure 4). This might be excellent capability in resource allocation or 
in management. A company, to be competitive in the new business, must find its core 
competence that may exists in the current business. If a firm has a competence in 
establishing a distribution network, it can deploy this network to transfer its existing 
strategic assets to the new business or to acquire new strategic assets from a new business 
with greater ease and higher efficiency (Prahalad, 1990; Very, 1993; Pehrsson, 2006).  
 
Figure 4:  Core competences and the „production functions‟ for assets (Williamson, 
1994)  
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3.4. INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 
I categorized a firm‟s decision to enter into another business area by the different 
cost benefit sources and the position of the original value chain into the vertical 
integration and the diversification. In vertical integration, reducing transaction costs and 
opportunistic behavior are the primary sources of cost benefit for the new business.  In 
diversification, securing the competitive cost structure is the primary source of the cost 
benefit in the new business.  These benefits must surmount the integration cost and be 
realized instantly.  
In the long-term, a firm must secure strategic assets of the new business by 
transferring its existing asset or by learning new ones from others. This is a requirement 
for the firm‟s long-term competitiveness. Therefore, the access plan to the new strategic 
assets has to be discussed and incorporated in the decision stage.  
Both in the short-term and long-term, a firm needs to be able to transfer its core 
competence to utilize its current strategic assets in the new business and to acquire 








Chapter 4: Implementation Modes 
I have discussed the theoretical reasoning, the benefits and limitations of vertical 
integration and diversification. Regarding the unclear theoretical applications and 
explanations done by the industrial research, the integrated framework was assessed in 
terms of the dynamics of business decisions and the long-term business life cycle.  
When a firm decides to enter new business area, it may obtain the whole 
ownership of another firm‟s assets. Or in some cases the firm may obtain leverage over 
another firm‟s asset without fully acquiring it (Harrigan, 1985).  In doing so, a firm may 
acquire the knowledge and material required to be profitable and competitive. 
In this section, I will discuss the three major decision modes to implement the 
new business of a firm: merger and acquisition, joint venture, and internal development. 
Each of these modes has its pros and cons in terms of integration cost and accessibility to 
core knowledge (Saee, 2007). A firm may decide to utilize only one of these modes at a 
time or to utilize several modes in a series of decisions. Even though many different 
modes can implement a firm‟s growth strategy, these three are considered typical 
implementation modes.  
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4.1. MERGER & ACQUISITION 
4.1.1. ADVANTAGE 
When a firm decides to enter a new business, investment requires not only new 
buildings and equipments but also the cost of securing new customers and distribution 
channels to ensure a smoothly operating business. If there is a firm in the target business 
area, which can be purchased, the acquiring firm would consider doing so if the total 
investment cost is less than that of directly entering the business. This opportunity also 
can provide customers, product distribution and input supply channels at once. In 
addition, a firm curtails the time it needs to develop a new business and as well as the 
risks during the business cycle (Ji, 2000).  
If a firm wants to grow with no change to the existing position of other producers, 
and if acquiring a firm is less expensive than expanding internally, then it will choose to 
acquire the other producer. This strategy seeks to reduce competition or to change the 
industrial asset control such as patent rights and monopolistic input resource supply. If 
the acquired firm can lend an advantage in terms of market entry cost, acquiring the firm 
may be highly profitable, giving even more value to its present value (Penrose, 2009). 
Undervaluation of a market may also explain the benefit of acquiring a firm. In 
that case, the stock market may be short of information about a firm. Its annual reports, 
balance sheets, and other statements may provide too little information on its 
performance.  Such a scenario presents an opportunity to get the firm at a discount. If a 
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firm can find out the real value of the target firm, it will profit by taking over its stock or 
security. 
Loss from one firm can be converted to assets for another firm when it deducts 
this loss from its taxable income.  The acquisition may offset the profit of the acquiring 
firm. And when a firm wants to liquidize its subsidiary, the capital gains tax may be less 
than the income tax rate, affecting the seller's profit.  
4.1.2. LIMITATION 
The value of a firm to be acquired can be calculated by its present value through 
the cash flow of a given period. The price of the firm should at least equal its present 
value. When merger and acquisition is made and the asset is exchanged for its market 
price, it is hard to gauge the value gained by the merger and acquisition. If merger and 
acquisition can add to the value, this deal requires a strict discipline in its valuation, 
including the likely synergy. Therefore, an acquisition that at its present value cannot add 
value, will not be worth the capital investment of the acquisition. 
A firm deciding to enter a new business that wants to purchase some strategic 
assets may find the existing firm unwilling to sell those assets and thus preventing the 
entrance of the new firm.  Instead, the existing firm sells in one package all of the assets.  
The acquiring firm must then consider the exact value of the firm it wants to acquire.  
The firm wanting to be acquired will try to maximize its gain by increasing, up to the 
point of it no longer being profitable, the price of the acquisition (Wiersema, 1995).  In 
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such a case, only when the candidate is unable to realize its value and   the acquirer 
possesses the information for the valuation, the acquirer can profit from the merger. 
Another limitation to mergers and acquisitions is that if there are many firms in 
the same business area that also want to expand, competition among them would be 
intensified and the profitability would be reduced by the increased price.  
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4.2. JOINT VENTURE 
Harrigon (1985) and Hennart (1988) claimed that joint ventures take diverse 
forms and are used for various purposes. Both studies assumed that entering a joint 
venture comes from a desire to minimize the transaction cost. They classified joint 
ventures into two: „scale‟ and „link‟.  'Scale' joint ventures are where more than two firms 
combine in an adjacent production stage or distribution or a new market. The parent firms 
may want to do the same thing through this scale joint venture.  They may want to 
vertically integrate forward or backward, horizontally expand, or diversify. For example, 
an assembly firm may establish a joint venture with another assembly firm to produce 
some common components of their production line. This joint venture realizes economy 
of scale by reducing the production cost of those components; not doing so would leave 
both parent firms with higher costs. Therefore, the joint venture can be a useful mode 
where economy of scale for a component is much larger for a joint venture than for 
individual firms on their own. Stuckey (1983) argued that this type of joint venture can 
come from the market inefficiency for intermediate inputs as illustrated in the example of 
the aluminum industry. 
On the other hand, a „link‟ joint venture is the result of the asymmetric activities 
of its parent firm. That is, one parent firm will make a joint venture with its vertical 
integration with another firm which wants its diversification. As competition increases in 
the current global market, entering it with the equipment of a wholly owned local 
distribution channel is getting expensive and less profitable.  A firm may instead choose a 
 34 
joint venture to maximize its market size with low investment. A firm may also exchange 
the required knowledge in the new market with another firm in the joint venture.  In 
addition, establishing with a local firm may soften the hostility to a foreign firm.  
However, these two types of joint venture have common characteristics in their 
governance structure. One is their relationship through the equity sharing among parent 
firms. The other is those parent firms hold a shared ownership which is different from the 
wholly-owned subsidiary of a firm. Therefore, joint venture is the form of a particular 
internalization.  
4.2.1. ADVANTAGE 
Knowledge can be shared in a joint venture (Reuer, 2000). In a link joint venture, 
the used knowledge is asymmetric; the vertically integrated parent firm may provide 
technical expertise and the diversified parent firm provides the market knowhow in the 
region. In the scale joint venture, the symmetric knowledge can be shared. Both parent 
companies can provide the same type of knowledge and the merged knowledge can be 
utilized to produce a new product.  Firms may do this when it is hard to transfer in 
written form a firm‟s specific knowledge, such as their experience in production and 
marketing in a specific region. This kind of knowledge is better shared in a joint venture. 
Moreover, a technology-intensive parent firm can send its technical and managerial 
personnel to transfer a wide range of knowhow, while this is impossible with other 
modes. 
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For a small and young firm, access to the capital market is difficult. Joint venture 
with a fund-requiring firm can be an efficient method of funding risky projects. Harrigan 
(1985) showed a number example of small R&D firms using joint ventures with larger 
firms to finance projects that that would've been impossible to finance either internally or 
through the capital market.  
4.2.2. DISADVANTAGE 
As Hennart (1988) makes clear, the joint venture should be considered as the 
foundation of its dynamic process which can focus on the rate of decay of some of the 
advantages traded in a joint venture, particularly knowledge (Jiatao, 1995; Reuer, 2001).  
Harrigan (1985) claimed that there were drawbacks to using the joint venture. 
When a joint venture is implemented to expand internationally, the international joint 
venture may have a problem with its domestic partners or hosting country. When the 
objective of a parent firm is to take the advantage from a country, but its partner or 
hosting county wants to import the high technology of a firm, conflicts will arise because 
of the different viewpoints on a joint venture. 
Another limitation is that there may be a cultural problem between parent firms. 
Each parent firm wants to coordinate the joint venture with their own culture. This desire 
creates communication problems and long decision processes, which may harm the 
flexibility of the joint venture. Likewise, parent firms may be concerned about the loss of 
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control over its investment, technology, and knowledge, which might be siphoned off by 
others. 
Also, the motivation behind a joint venture will wither when a parent firm wants 
too much control over the joint venture‟s strategic decisions such as investment, 
expansion, and representatives on the board of the joint venture, or if the parent firm 
gives little attention to these factors. 
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4.3. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT 
4.3.1. ADVANTAGE 
A company can decide on internal development when it has enough resources in 
its existing business to utilize in the new business. A firm may recombine its current 
strategic assets with its existing competence. It can adapt them in a timely manner to the 
changing business environment by extending the staging decision with low cost over a 
long period of time (Penrose. 2009) 
This mode‟s most important advantage is its easiness. Employees who embrace 
the same culture as a firm can easily and effectively transfer its internal strategic assets. 
The firm‟s competence concerning its existing business unit can be applied instantly to 
the new business (Very, P. 1993). Furthermore, through the internal development 
process, a firm can accumulate the learning and experience that can be accumulated as 
the new business grows. This knowledge and experience can become a new resource for 
the further growth of the firm. 
In a case where no firms possess the strategic assets required for a new business, 
the internal development may be the only mode to choose.  This is especially true in the 
early stage of a business life cycle, when the firm has insufficient resources to compete in 
a new business field.  A firm here must go the internal development route, as there is no 
other option to acquire strategic assets in the new business (Olivier, 2010). 
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4.3.2. LIMITATION 
Among possible modes, internal development can be an easy one.  However, 
there may be no technology for the completion of a new product, or once the firm has a 
new product, demand may be too low to achieve economies of scale.  Hence, a firm has 
no chance at success if the market they are entering is not ready for the adaption of the 
internal development.  
Moreover, internal development normally requires long term support and 
management decision making. Therefore, over a relatively long period, if management 
offers insufficient attention or support to the internal development, the success of that 
business is imperiled.   
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Chapter 5: Entrance into E&P Business of the Refining Company 
5.1. E&P INDUSTRY 
5.1.1. OVERVIEW 
The uniqueness in this business is the high risk of the uncertainties, such as a dry 
hole, which can mean no return (Lerche, 1999). The nature of oil depletion requires 
continuous investment to secure a long-term sustainable business. Also, E&P business 
requires unique and combined knowledge in geology and engineering such as oil field 
delineation, facilities determination, and flow control (Figure 6). Moreover, despite the 
promising geological environments, a host country‟s political conditions must be 
favorable. 
To be successful in this business, a firm must have the most appropriate 
technology and business process without any loss in safety and environmental standards. 
Therefore to maximize the profitability of the investment, it has to integrate knowledge 
gained from former experiences (Jahn, 2008). 
In the first stage of E&P, before the first drilling, a firm must carry out field work, 
magnetic surveys, and seismic surveys to evaluate the prospective area.  Supposing the 
exploration drilling finds oil, the data gathered during this stage provides too little 
information on the amounts of oil and its producibility.  The firm must appraise the oil 
well. At this stage, more detailed data are gathered to reduce the uncertainties regarding 
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the reserve and to make an initial estimate. If the reserve turns out to be economically 
viable, the next step is a feasibility study including the generation of technical 
alternatives to use, process design and equipment size, etc. After considering cost and the 
estimated revenue of each alternative, the firm selects the most economical mode.  Once 
the budget is committed to for executing the field development plan, producing the oil 
follows a sequence: detailed design, procurement, facilities fabrication and installation, 
and commissioning. 
 
Figure 6:  E&P business and its strategic assets (Source: Lerche, 1999., Jahn, 2008., ) 
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5.1.2. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
The major E&P companies are integrated International Oil Companies (IOCs) and 
National Oil Companies (NOCs) (Table 2). Their business areas are integrated in E&P 
and refining for the global market. While in developed countries most of those integrated 
companies are public, many integrated oil companies in developing countries are NOCs 
with securing s their own oil and gas resources in their countries.  
Therefore, due to the difference of their origins, public and national oil companies 
have quite different objectives.  While a public company‟s objective is to maximize the 
shareholder‟s value, the objectives of NOCs are more complicated.  Besides wanting to 
maximize profit, they must consider the security of their national resources, the wealth of 
their people and other political issues, all of which  can affect the management of those 
oil companies. 
Table 2:  Ranking the World Oil Companies (Energy Intelligence Weekly)  
 
In addition to these types of big oil companies, there are independent oil 







1 Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabia 100% 11 Pemex Mexico 100%
2 NIOC Iran 100% 12 Sonatrach Algeria 100%
3 ExxonMobil US 13 Gazprom Russia 0.5
4 PDV Venezuela 100% 14 KPC Kuwait 100%
5 CNPC China 100% 15 Petrobras Brazil 32%
6 BP UK 16 Rosneft Russia 0.75
7 Shell UK/Netherlands 17 Petronas Malaysia 1
8 Conocophiliips US 18 Adnoc UAE 1
9 Chevron US 19 Lukoil Russia
10 Total France 20 NNPC Nigeria 1
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companies as non-integrated companies which receive nearly all of its revenues from 
production at the wellhead. Their major activities are the exploration and production with 
a small marketing or refining segment. 
Some companies own and operate their own fleet of offshore drilling rigs, but 
most of the oil companies engage in drilling contracts with offshore drilling contractors. 
Moreover, the service providers provide global services at every stage of E&P business 
activities (Hallwood, 1991; Lee, 2008). Therefore, E&P companies sometimes own only 
their capital assets such as the platforms and cranes and outsource many parts of the E&P 
services such as drilling and mud logging. However, they may hold the 
engineering/production consultancy, which are their core strategic assets of the business. 
In this business area, consortia allow oil companies to take part in a number of 
drilling projects, each of them with a limited probability of success, rather than in a few 
wholly owned drilling ventures (Skaf, 1999., Bridge, 2005). 
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5.1.3. RECENT PERFORMANCE 
Owing to the recent global recession, the recent financial performances of the 
E&P companies are worse than that of three to five years ago. However, IOCs show 
relatively low higher performances than independent oil companies. Many independent 
E&P oil companies over the past two years show negative profitability (Figure 
7).Therefore, we can assume that big IOCs have greater knowledge and more promising 
assets in this business than many oil companies.  
 
Figure 7:  Top 20 integrated oil companies, 20 independent oil companies of which 
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5.2. REFINING INDUSTRY 
5.2.1. OVERVIEW 
In the chain of production, a refining company purchases the crude oil from the 
oil market and produces a diversity of products ranging from petroleum gas to 
transportations fuel (Figure 8). 
A refinery comprises two major processes. One is to distill crude oil and the other 
is to upgrade the final product.  The direct distillation of crude oil is a physical process 
that utilizes the different boiling points of the hydrocarbon components of the crude oil. 
The distillated oil products then go through further processes, such as de-sulfurizing, to 
meet their market‟s product specifications. Product upgrading enhances the low-value 
refining products. For example, the hydrocracker adds value to the bunker fuel by 
cracking and converting it to diesel product. 
These two processes determine the refining margin. Thus, a refinery equipped 
only with distillation-related facilities, can get its margin only from the price difference 
between the refining product and the crude oil price. Therefore, its profit is mainly 
dependent on the crude oil quality.  This type of refinery has to purchase high quality 
crude oil at a relatively higher price. This refinery, thus, has little flexibility in selecting 
its crude oil.  In contrast a refinery with full upgrading facilities can realize a higher 
combined profit from the value-added product from the upgrading facilities and the 
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flexibility in crude oil selection. Thus, this type of refinery, owning the upgrading 
facilities, is more competitive than a refinery equipped with distillation facilities only.  
 
Figure 8:  Refining business activities 
 
In this regard, refining is a capital-intensive business. To be competitive, the 
production base requires not only distillation-related facilities but also high capital 
investment for the product-upgrading facilities. However, the cash flow of capital 
investment for both refining and E&P show different results (Figure 9).  
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5.2.2. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
Some refining companies have their own retail business and oil transportation 
network.  Some have previously diversified into downstream businesses such as 
petrochemical and lube oil. And these diversified refining companies normally have some 
level of the competitiveness with the economies of scale by its refining capacity. 
While a company may diversify in many ways into the downstream of oil 
refining, there are not many refining companies that enter the E&P business. Several 
Korean and Japanese refining companies having regional economies of scale and 
competitiveness take part in these activities.  
5.2.3. RECENT PERFORMANCE 
Currently the refining industry is underperforming E&P. This is due to the 
shrinking refining margin both in distillation and upgrading. As we can see in Figure 9, a 
refining company‟s performance typically depends on the difference between the price of 
crude oil and the price of the final product.  Refineries having a low level of complexity 
in their facilities have no chance at profiting from their negative skimming margin. 
However, those that have invested in their upgrading facilities can enjoy profitable 
returns.  
In terms of a refining company‟s working capital, however, the high price of 
crude oil negatively affects all refining companies.  Compared to the low crude oil prices 
of the early of 2000s, refineries‟ inventory costs have been negatively affected. For 
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example, if a refining company operates a refinery with a capacity of two hundred 
thousand (200,000) barrels per day, and if it has to reserve five days‟ inventory of crude 
oil, a ten dollar increase in the price of crude oil would require an additional ten million 
dollars, directly affecting a company‟s annual cash flow. 
 
Figure 9:  Net income vs. refining margin (Annual report of Valero, Historical refining 
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5.3. INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK APPROACH: REFINING COMPANIES DECISION TO E&P 
Several refining companies, especially in Korea and Japan, have entered into 
E&P.  One reason for this is that these companies have economies of scale in refining and 
in its downstream business.  Such economies enable a stable profit and regional 
competitiveness. 
Another reason is that these companies have unique shareholder structures, where 
their managers can directly decide the company‟s business portfolio. The top 
management owns a substantial share of the major companies in Korea (Kim, 2004), and, 
likewise, the major shareholders of the Japanese companies are banks (Geringer, 2000; 
Fukui, 2007; Schaede, 2008). All of these unique shareholder‟s structures may justify the 
management‟s  decision to enter new business.  
The relative higher performance of the E&P industry apparently offer sufficient 
motivation for a refining company to try entering this field (Figure 10). As I addressed in 
the theory section, however, this simple motivation guarantees neither the further 
productive activities nor the higher financial performance which the company expected 
when it decided to enter the field. 
It is unclear whether we should view their entering E&P in terms of vertical 
integration or diversification.  These two businesses may or may not lie on a same value 
chain of the oil business.  We should thus discuss and review both integration theories 
before determining the refining company‟s entrance to E&P. And, through the utilization 
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of the discussed integrated approach, a refining company can find out whether there is an 
opportunity ensuring the short-term benefits and long-term advantages, and whether their 
existing core competence can promote effectively its existing strategic assets to E&P. 
In the continuing decision perspective, if a firm has committed to allocating its 
resources to integrate and has got is objectives of that decision, then a firm may look for 
another opportunity in a new business area. 
 























2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
$ / Bbl$ million
Exxon Mobil Income vs. Crude Oil Price 
Upstream Downstream
Chemical Crude Oil Price
 51 
5.3.1. CORE COMPETENCE 
Foremost, to be competitive in the new business, a company must find their core 
competence. If a refining company possesses coordination skills and competitive 
capability in resource allocation through management, it can apply them to E&P. In 
addition, decision makers must consider what kinds of their existing strategic assets 
(Table 3) can be transferred to the E&P business.  They must also decide how to transfer 
or apply them with their core competences:  
 Knowledge in managing the diverse business units (e.g. Refining and its 
downstream petrochemical complex) 
 Operation of the capital-intensive industry 
 Capital investment management (e.g. project planning, financing, execution). 
 Purchasing and/or trading oil and petroleum products in local and regional market 
 Operational excellence in the local and/or regional market 
 Management excellence with vision 
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Table 3: Strategic assets in the existing refining company 





 brand recognition in the local and regional market 
 customer loyalty 
channel assets  crude oil and petroleum products trading 
 distribution network of the petroleum products 
 petrochemical or byproduct business network 
 distributor loyalty 
input assets  knowledge of imperfect factor of the oil markets 
 financial capacity from the refining performance 
 loyalty of oil suppliers  
process assets  knowledge in crude oil and petroleum products trading  
 proprietary technology in refinery operation and maintenance  
 knowledge in combined operation with refinery and its downstream 
facilities such as petrochemical plant  
 product or market-specific functional experience  
market knowledge 
assets  
 local and regional market specific experience 
 Location of the entrance area 
 accumulated information on competitors,  





In the decision to enter a new business, management must consider the short-term 
benefit. In this regard, a refining company has to determine its sources of cost benefits. 
From a vertical integration perspective, we can consider the normal oil supply market to 
work well. That is, if there is a no opportunistic behavior, the transaction cost reduction 
cannot overcome the cost of integrating.  Thus it would be better to purchase the required 
oil directly from the market. A refining company is unlikely to achieve a cost benefit by 
entering E&P. On the other hand, when oil reserves are near the refining base and the oil 
market in that region works poorly, there can exist a site specificity, which can provide a 
cost benefit to entering E&P in that region. In this case, even if the oil production from 
one reservoir cannot meet the refinery‟s capacity and even if opportunistic behavior is 
minor, entering regional E&P activities, by integration can provide a cost benefit to the 
refining company. 
From a diversification perspective, a refining company may have some strategic 
assets that they can apply immediately to E&P business. If oil reservoirs are located in 
the oil trading business area of a refining company and the refining company has been 
competitive in that region, entering E&P can be an opportunity to achieve cost benefit 
through integration.  Considering, however, the different business characteristics 
reviewed in the E&P industry, there may be a low level of strategic assets to immediately 
transfer to E&P. If it is, it may be hard to align its existing strategic assets with those of 
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the E&P‟s strategic assets. The core competence of the refining company may not do its 
catalytic role in transferring its current strategic assets to E&P to realize any cost benefit. 
Implementation Mode 
When entering E&P promises a cost benefit, a refining company may have the 
site specificity or specific capability in region. As an E&P business in a geographically 
different market has weak reasoning for the refining companies‟ opportunity, we should 
regard the refining company‟s entrance to E&P as having limited opportunity for its 
short-term benefit from either a vertical integration or a diversification perspective.  
In the general E&P business, as consortia allow oil companies to take part in a 
number of drilling projects with a limited probability of success, a refining company can 
also pursue this opportunity to find the optimum implementation mode. If this integration 
can be done with a minimum share acquisition of an E&P project in the region, they may 
not require a separated business unit in it. Instead, it can utilize its existing unit at a 
minimum cost. For example, the crude oil purchasing part of a refining company can take 
the functional work to acquire the equity crude from the oil production venture. This 
activity may reduce the former work load of that purchasing unit, which required 
competition to acquire that amount of crude oil quickly. Or this can be an opportunity to 
utilize the excess resources of that unit. Therefore, the participation of a geographically 
adjacent E&P development project consortia or joint venture can be chosen as its 
optimum short-term decision mode. With this mode, a refining company can get its cost 
benefit at a slight integration cost. It can secure the oil supply from this organization and 
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have a base from which to try acquiring the strategic assets it currently lacks but needs 
for future growth.  
On the contrary, considering the weak relationship among the strategic assets 
between refining and E&P businesses, and the integration-related cost for a new inner 
organization, merger or acquisition of an E&P company may not provide a cost benefit to 
the refining company. Moreover, this cannot benefit them greatly only considering that 
the E&P business does not respond quickly. 
Likewise, internal development would not be possible because new knowledge 





When the entrance into the E&P secures the short-term benefit, this new business 
should be competitive during the long-term business life cycle. Therefore, whether it is 
from the vertical integration or diversification, the refining company has to acquire the 
new strategic assets in the E&P business. If some strategic assets of the E&P business are 
acquired, the E&P business is no longer a new business. Refining companies can 
accelerate their acquiring of strategic assets and can choose another growth strategy. To 
the degree that they acquire strategic assets, the refining company can find other optimum 
implementation modes as part of  its continuing decision making. 
Implementation Mode 
At this stage, the decision should consider both the cost benefit and the 
competitiveness in the business. If entering E&P ends up as a small equity investment in 
a regional E&P consortium, and only keeps status quo, the refining company may enjoy 
the return on investment by their working interest. However, even if the consortium 
resulted in great success, there would be no opportunity in acquiring the strategic assets 
in the E&P business. They cannot access the operation of the E&P consortium. 
Moreover, the operator and other big equity partners of the consortium would not transfer 
any knowledge of the E&P business to its small equity participants.  
The company should thus consider an equity increase to strengthen its position in 
the consortium or taking other opportunities by participating with other consortia in the 
region (Harrigan, 1985). By doing either of these, it can promote its relationships with the 
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operating company and with other equity partners. It can acquire experience obtaining 
some knowhow.  For example, it will better understand the E&P consortium‟s holding 
countries and be familiar with the bidding process of the E&P service companies and 
drilling contractors.  To do that, it may be necessary at this stage to develop an 
organization that will manage several consortia and to acquire the strategic assets. And 
also the management of the refining company has to consider the balance of the benefit 
and the internalization cost of each decision mode.  
Additionally, as described in the short-term implementation modes, the refining 
company can expect an advantage only from site specificity or excellent operations 
regionally. Therefore, during the transportation of the strategic assets, management may 
have to focus on the regional E&P consortia or joint venture for its additional 
opportunity. If the firm successfully acquires several key strategic assets in E&P and 
successfully generate positive cash flow, the refining company may consider the E&P 
business as another current business.  
Then, even though there are remaining strategic assets to be acquired, it can 
broaden its E&P business area with its stable refining business unit and newly 
incorporated E&P business. Its core competence can accelerate competitiveness in E&P 
and reduce the intensity of the regional limitation. The accumulated experience with the 
enhanced capability to acquire and share strategic assets in the business may open up 
opportunities to join global E&P ventures (Finch, 2002). 
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The refining company can take another implementation mode for future growth. If 
there is a firm in the E&P business area which can be bought, the refining company can 
consider acquiring it, under the condition that the total investment cost is less than that of 
its direct entrance cost in a new area. Among the advantages in merger and acquisition, 
curtailing the time requirement to acquire the strategic assets in the E&P business would 
be crucial. 
As discussed in the decision mode section, a refining company may want some 
selective key strategic assets which it has not acquired through the current E&P 
operation, such as knowhow concerning the optimization of engineering planning.  If, 
however, the E&P Company wants to sell all the assets in one package, then the refining 
company must consider the exact value of the E&P company, so as not to decrease the 
profitability by that merger and acquisition. Likewise when there is competition in the 
bidding to acquire an E&P company, the refining company, through a strict valuation of 
the E&P company, should avoid profitability loss by the competition. 
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5.4. APPLICATION OF THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: KOREAN REFINING COMPANIES 
In Korea, two refining companies are currently involved in E&P business 
activities. As discussed in 5.3, these companies have economies of scale in refining and 
in their downstream businesses, providing stable profit and regional competitiveness. 
Also, these companies have unique shareholder structures which enable the management 
to decide whether or not to enter the new business. To apply the developed integrated 
framework, I denote them as „A‟ and „B‟ refining companies. „A‟ decided to enter E&P 
in the early 2000s; „B‟ entered earlier, in the 1980s. Both refining companies share 
similar financial performances except in the E&P business (Figure 11). 
  
Figure 11: Corporate Operating Income (Source: Annual Reports) 
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5.4.1. ‘B’ COMPANY’S ACTIVITIES BEFORE 2000 
„B‟, a privatized refining company in the early 1980s, was a national refining 
company in the early 1960s. In 1983 it began investing in E&P in Southeast Asia. Its first 
success, however, was in the Middle East, in Yemen in 1987. „B‟ owned a small share of 
the project and has lifted an average of over 2 million barrels of equity oil per year. In the 
1990s, three other small successes were made in other regions, again in the Mideast, as 
well as Latin America and Northwest Africa. The equity oil production in each of these 
regions, however, amounted to less than 3,000 barrels per day.  
In these two decades, from the integrated framework perspective, the core 
competence must not have been considered in B‟s decision to enter the E&P business. 
During that era, it secured profits only in the domestic market thanks to a governmental 
policy that promoted the refining industry to help develop the national economy. 
Moreover, the company may have had a hard time building up its core competence 
because of a low level of complexity at the refining facilities and limited experience in oil 
and petroleum product trading. Furthermore, there were, at that time, low strategic assets 
to apply to E&P. 
Moreover, in the integrated framework, B‟s decision to enter E&P fails to fit the 
short-term requirement. Let us concede the site specificity of lifting equity oil from the 
Mideast to its refinery. Nevertheless, its activities in Latin America and Northwest Africa 
provide, from a vertical integration viewpoint, insufficient rationale for B‟s decision. 
Rather, it is likely the result of the diversification trend of that era. Considering, however, 
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the relatedness of the strategic assets of that time in both E&P and the refining business, 
it seems to be an unrelated diversification. As discussed above, research on the 
relationship between relatedness and financial performance suggests that unrelated 
diversification is unlikely to deliver better performance.  To illustrate this, during the past 
two decades, „B‟ has participated in about fifty E&P projects in more than 20 countries in 
Southeast Asia, Latin America, Northwest Africa, and Australia. There seems to be a 
very low level of relatedness in terms of regions. Only four of these projects (20%) have 
realized their commercial production of oil. In addition, there was insufficient knowledge 
in „B‟ to handle its equity oil except that coming from the Middle East. 
During this time, „B‟ participated in E&P projects with a small share acquisition, 
and it did not establish a separate business unit for E&P. Instead, it only utilized its 
existing unit at a slight integration cost. Also, the cash inflow from the productive oil 
wells was reinvested in other E&P opportunities. These investments enabled „B‟ to 
continue to fund its E&P activities. The performance over two decades is not exceptional, 
however, „B‟s participation in various E&P projects enabled them to acquire some 
strategic assets in E&P business.  
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5.4.2. ‘B’ COMPANY’S ACTIVITY AFTER 2000 
Discovering oil in Vietnam in 2000 accelerated „B‟s E&P activities. It increased 
their participation in E&P consortia (Figure 12). Moreover, it extended B‟s strategic E&P 
region of to the North Sea, West Kamchatka, and South America. The company has 
accumulated some strategic assets and is now an operator in several E&P projects.  
 
Figure 12: E&P Projects of „B‟ Company (Source: Annual Reports) 
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To achieve its long-term goals in the E&P business, „B‟ has decided to become 
more active in its acquisitions of strategic assets in E&P. As discussed above, if E&P 
entry is implemented as only a small equity investment, there is little opportunity to 
acquire strategic assets, especially crucial technical and operational knowledge, in the 
E&P business. Operators and large equity partners dominate the decision-making 
process.  In response to this reality, „B‟ has been increasing its equity share in E&P 
consortia to strengthen its position and to acquire the required strategic assets. In some 
projects, „B‟ made fifty to fifty equity partnerships with the operator of the project. 
Furthermore, it has considered a merger and acquisition of an E&P company as a way to 
accelerate its learning and business performance. 
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5.4.3. ‘A’ COMPANY’S ACTIVITY AFTER 2000 
In the late 1960s, „A‟ company started its business as the first Korean public 
refining company. Even though its current financial performance and business interests 
are similar to „B‟ company, it only entered the E&P business in the early 2000s. Since 
then, it has been active as a small equity investor in six E&P consortia in Southeast Asia.  
 „A‟ has focused only on Southeast Asia, a reasonable course from the integrated 
framework perspective. It considers its core competence to be regional excellence in oil 
and product trading in the Asia-Pacific. Also, it understands the different strategic assets 
between refining and E&P and thus there is low level of the strategic assets to apply 
directly to E&P.  
As a short-term requirement, we can explain their focus on Southeast Asia as an 
entrance to E&P by its site specificity from the vertical integration perspective. That is, 
when oil reserves are near a refining base and the oil market in that region shows any 
signs of market power or opportunistic behavior, „A‟ can secure a cost benefit by entering 
E&P in that region. As discussed above, even when its equity oil cannot meet its 
refinery‟s full capacity and even when opportunistic behavior is minor, entering regional 
E&P activities can provide a cost benefit. Therefore, though having no successful results 
yet from these activities, „A‟ should focus its current decisions to avoid the errors made 
by „B’ during its long-term E&P period. By doing this it can utilize effectively its equity 
oil when it is produced, which also fits the short-term requirement of the integrated 
framework.  
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Once „A‟ realizes cash inflow by discovering oil, it may be better to reinvest in 
additional opportunities in the same region. They should do so until „A‟ acquires some 
strategic assets which require it to widen its opportunities in other regions and until its 
E&P business has become a new profit center. And then, it can continue its new decisions 
of acquiring the strategic assets in E&P to compete in the market. This is currently 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
While not a large number of companies have done so yet, some Korean and 
Japanese refining companies have entered into E&P. These companies are apparently 
motivated by the relative high financial performance of the E&P industry, their own 
limited margins in refining, and the slow market growth. It is not clear, however, whether 
these business environments alone can ensure the success of their growth strategy. In 
deciding to enter another business area, management should take into consideration other 
factors.  
To determine the proper motivation and rationale for choosing an organizational 
strategy and the specific mode of implementation, we reviewed two major growth 
theories: vertical integration and diversification. In vertical integration, transaction costs 
in the market and future opportunistic behavior of opponent firms are major factors that 
substitute internal organization for buying through a market transaction. In 
diversification, to enjoy the economies of scope or economies of scale, a firm must be 
able to utilize its current strategic asset in a new business, which makes the relatedness 
important in deciding the strategy of a firm‟s growth. Also, in allocating its resources and 
transferring its current strategic assets into a new business, a company must utilize 
effectively its core competencies.  
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However, when the market works well and/or there are few strategic assets to 
share, integrating another business can be limited in its success. The integration‟s 
increased complexity may cause poor resource allocation, and the decision should avoid 
the agency problem. Moreover, even when management executes a decision that lowers 
risk from future uncertainties, they should consider that shareholders can also decide on 
the same level of risk management. 
In the integrated framework approach, a firm‟s integration of other business area 
is categorized by the different cost benefit sources and by the position of the original 
value chain into the vertical integration and the diversification. The short-term benefit is 
derived from the cost benefit in reducing transaction costs, from reducing opportunistic 
behavior, or from securing a competitive cost structure in the new business. These 
benefits must be superior to the integration cost. For the long-term requirement, as a new 
business requires different strategic assets to compete with other firms, a firm has to 
secure strategic assets by transferring its existing assets or by learning it from others. To 
secure short-term and long-term benefits, a firm needs its core competence to transfer its 
current strategic assets to the new business and to acquire effectively the new strategic 
assets from the new business. 
With the understanding of the industrial characteristics of E&P and refining, the 
integrated framework is applied to the refining company‟s decision to enter into E&P. 
For short-term consideration, we regarded sources of cost benefit to be the site specificity 
in oil supply under market failure or the specific operational capability in the region. This 
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is also a limitation to entering into E&P. Thus venturing into E&P in geographically 
distant region may not provide a sound basis for a refining companies‟ decision. From a 
long-term outlook, a company should consider acquiring strategic assets, such as know-
how about controlling the drilling bids, technology service contractors, and engineering 
optimization during E&P project planning. 
As an early stage decision about going into E&P, a refining company can take 
part in some consortia of E&P projects in the region with a small equity and with a 
minimum integration cost. When it attains positive cash flow, it can consider increasing 
its equity stake so as to strengthen its position and acquire some strategic assets in the 
consortium.  
If a refining company manages to acquire some strategic assets, its E&P venture 
will no longer be considered a new business. At this point it can broaden its E&P 
interests with the stability of its refining business unit and newly incorporated E&P 
business. At this stage, it can accelerate competitiveness in E&P and free itself of 
geographic limitations. The company might choose to participate in global E&P consortia 







Aggarwal, R. 2009. “The Diversification Discount Puzzle: Evidence for a Transaction-
Cost Resolution.” Financial Review, 44(1): 113-135. 
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. 1981. “Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate 
Mergers.” The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2): 605-617. 
Andrei, S., & Robert, W. V. 1986. “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control.” The 
Journal of Political Economy, 94(3): 461-488. 
Arocena, P. 2008. “Cost and quality gains from diversification and vertical integration in 
the electricity industry: A DEA approach.” Energy Economics, 30(1): 39-58. 
Bridge, G., & Wood, A. 2005. “Geographies of knowledge, practices of globalization: 
learning from the oil exploration and production industry.” Area, 37(2): 199-208. 
Besanko, D.,  Dranove, D., Shanley, M. 1996, Economics of Strategy. New York:John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Carlton, D.W., Perloff, J.M. Modern Industrial Organization: Fourth Edition. 
Boston:MA, Pearson 
Claessens, S. 2003. “When does corporate diversification matter to productivity and 
performance? Evidence from East Asia.” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 11(3). 
Coase, R. H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, 4(16): 386-405. 
Constantinos, C. M. 1995. “Diversification, Restructuring and Economic Performance.” 
Strategic Management Journal, 16(2): 101-118. 
Fan, J. P. H. 2006. “On the patterns and wealth effects of vertical mergers.” Journal of 
Business, 79(2): 877-902. 
Financial Supervisory Service, 2010, Refining Companies Annual Report 
http://dart.fss.or.kr/  (Accessed November 18, 2010) 
Frery, F. 2006. “The fundamental dimensions of strategy.” MIT SLOAN Management 
Review, 48(1): 71. 
Fukui, Y., & Ushijima, T. 2007. “Corporate diversification, performance, and 
restructuring in the largest Japanese manufacturers.” Journal of the Japanese and 
International Economies, 21(3): 303-323. 
Geringer, J. M., Stephen, T., & David, M. O. 2000. “Product and International 
Diversification among Japanese Multinational Firms.” Strategic Management 
Journal, 21(1): 51-80. 
Finch, H. J. 2002. “Transferring exploration and production activities within the UK's 
upstream oil and gas industry: a capabilities perspective.” Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics, 12(1): 55-81. 
Hallwood, C. P. 1991. “On Choosing Organizational Arrangements: The Example of 
Offshore Oil Gathering.” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 38(3): 227-241. 
Harrigan, K. R. 1985. “Vertical Integration and Corporate Strategy.” The Academy of 
Management Journal, 28(2): 397-425. 
 70 
Harrigan, K. R. 1985. “Chapter 12” In Strategies for Joint Ventures. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books 
Hennart, J.-F. 1988. “A Transaction Costs Theory of Equity Joint Ventures.” Strategic 
Management Journal, 9(4): 361-374. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Johnson, R. A., & Moesel, D. D. 1993. “Construct Validity 
of an Objective (Entropy) Categorical Measure of Diversification Strategy.” 
Strategic Management Journal, 14(3): 215-235. 
Ji, H.J., Park, Y.W. 2000, M&A, Seoul, Korea, Bub Moon Sa. 
Jiatao, L. 1995. “Foreign Entry and Survival: Effects of Strategic Choices on 
Performance in International Markets.” Strategic Management Journal, 16(5): 
333-351. 
Jahn, F. 2008. Hydrocarbon exploration and production. Amsterdam. 2nd.Edition. 
Elsevier, 2008. 
Joseph, T. M. 1992. “The Choice of Organizational Form: Vertical Financial Ownership 
Versus Other Methods of Vertical Integration.” Strategic Management Journal, 
13(8): 559-584. 
Jung, D.S.,Chu,K.W.,Park,J.H.2010.Business Strategy. Seoul , Korea: Management and 
Future.  
Kim, H., Hoskisson, R. E., Tihanyi, L., & Hong, J. 2004. “The Evolution and 
Restructuring of Diversified Business Groups in Emerging Markets: The Lessons 
from Chaebols in Korea.” Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 21(1): 25-48. 
Lerche, I., & MacKay, J. A. 1999. Economic risk in Hydrocarbon Eyxploration. San 
Diego: CA: Academic Press. 
Li, M. 2006. “Business groups and market failures: A focus on vertical and horizontal 
strategies.” Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23(4): 439-452. 
Mahoney, J. T. 1992. “The Choice of Organizational Form: Vertical Financial Ownership 
Versus Other Methods of Vertical Integration.” Strategic Management Journal, 
13(8): 559-584. 
Markides, C. C. 1997. “To Diversify or Not to Diversify.” Harvard Business Review, 
75(6): 93-99. 
Markides, C. C., & Williamson, P. J. 1994. “Related Diversification, Core Competencies 
and Corporate Performance.” Strategic Management Journal, 15: 149-165. 
Masten, S. E., Meehan, J. W., Jr., & Snyder, E. A. 1991. “The Costs of Organization.” 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 7(1): 1-25. 
NYSE, 2010, Stock Price Information money.cnn.com/ (Accessed August 10, 2010) 
Olivier, F. 2010. Corporate Level Strategy: Theory and Applications. Hoboken, NJ : 
Taylor & Francis. 
Palich, L. E. 2000. “Curvilinearity in the diversification-performance linkage: An 
examination of over three decades.” Strategic Management Journal, 21(2). 
Pehrsson, A. 2006. “Businessrelatedness and performance: a study of managerial 
perceptions.” Strategic Management Journal, 27(3): 265-282. 
Penrose, E. 2009. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm.  4th Edittion. Oxford : OUP 
Oxford,  
 71 
Peter, J. L., Albert A. Cannella, Jr., & Michael, H. L. 1998. “Agency Problems as 
Antecedents to Unrelated Mergers and Diversification: Amihud and Lev 
Reconsidered.” Strategic Management Journal, 19(6): 555-578. 
Prahalad, C. K. 1990. “The Core Competence of the Corporation.” Harvard Business 
Review, 68(3): 79-91. 
Raphael, A., & Joshua, L. 1989. “Efficient Corporate Diversification: Methods and 
Implications.” Management Science, 35(7): 879-897. 
Reuer, J. J. 2000. “Parent Firm Performance across International Joint Venture Life-
Cycle Stages.” Journal of International Business Studies, 31(1): 1-20. 
Reuer, J. J. 2001. “From Hybrids to Hierarchies: Shareholder Wealth Effects of Joint 
Venture Partner Buyouts.” Strategic Management Journal, 22(1): 27-44. 
Saee, J. 14 Dec, 2007. Contemporary Corporate Strategy : Global Perspectives (1st ed.): 
Routledge. 
Schaede, U. 2008. Choose and Focus: Japanese Business Strategies for the 21
st
 Century. 
Ithaca:NY, Cornell University Press. 
SEC. 2010, Companies Annual Report(K-10, F-20). 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html SEC Company 
Search (Accessed September 2010) 
Shell. 2010. Historical refining margin http://www.shell.com/  (Accessed August 10, 
2010) 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1990. “The Takeover Wave of the 1980s.” Science, 
249(4970): 745. 
Skaf, M. A. 1999. “Portfolio Management in an Upstream Oil and Gas Organization.” 
Interfaces, 29(6): 84-104. 
Stuckey, J. A. 1983.Vertical Integration and Joint Ventures in the Aluminum Industry. 
Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press 
Very, P. 1993. “Success in diversification: Building on core competences.” Long Range 
Planning, 26(5): 80-92. 
Wiersema, M. F. 1995. “The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on Corporate-Growth and 
Diversification in Large Firms.” Strategic Management Journal, 16(6): 447-460. 
Williamson, O. E. 1971. “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations.” The American Economic Review, 61(2): 112-123. 
